Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back
Noûs 31:107-132 (2008)
| Abstract | For nearly thirty years, there has been a consensus (at least in English-speaking countries) that reductionism is a mistake and that there are autonomous special sciences. This consensus has been based on an argument from multiple realizability. But Jaegwon Kim has argued persuasively that the multiple realizability argument is flawed.1 I will sketch the recent history of the debate, arguing that much --but not all--of the anti-reductionist consensus survives Kim's critique. This paper was originally titled "Anti-Reductionism Strikes Back", but in the course of writing the paper, I came to think that the concepts used in the debate would not serve either position very well. | |||||||||
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