David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Review 108 (1):1-46 (1999)
The explanatory gap . Consciousness is a mystery. No one has ever given an account, even a highly speculative, hypothetical, and incomplete account of how a physical thing could have phenomenal states. Suppose that consciousness is identical to a property of the brain, say activity in the pyramidal cells of layer 5 of the cortex involving reverberatory circuits from cortical layer 6 to the thalamus and back to layers 4 and 6,as Crick and Koch have suggested for visual consciousness. .) Still, that identity itself calls out for explanation! Proponents of an explanatory gap disagree about whether the gap is permanent. Some say that we are like the scientifically naive person who is told that matter = energy, but does not have the concepts required to make sense of the idea. If we can acquire these concepts, the gap is closable. Others say the gap is uncloseable because of our cognitive limitations. Still others say that the gap is a consequence of the fundamental nature of consciousness.
|Keywords||Conceptual Analysis Dualism Epistemology Truth Chalmers, D Levine, J|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Kelly Trogdon (2013). Grounding: Necessary or Contingent? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):465-485.
Karen Bennett (2003). Why the Exclusion Problem Seems Intractable and How, Just Maybe, to Tract It. Noûs 37 (3):471-97.
Michael J. Raven (2015). Ground. Philosophy Compass 10 (5):322-333.
Katalin Balog (2012). In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.
Daniel Stoljar (2005). Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts. Mind and Language 20 (2):296-302.
Similar books and articles
Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). The Status of Consciousness in Nature. In Steven Miller (ed.), The Constitution of Consciousness, Volume 2. John Benjamins Publishing Company
Tobias Schlicht (2007). Erkenntnistheoretischer Dualismus. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 10:113-136.
Janice Dowell, J. L. (2008). A Priori Entailment and Conceptual Analysis: Making Room for Type-C Physicalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):93 – 111.
David J. Chalmers & Frank Jackson (2001). Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation. Philosophical Review 110 (3):315-61.
P. Kügler (2013). Non-Dualism Versus Conceptual Relativism. Constructivist Foundations 8 (2):247-252.
David J. Chalmers (2007). Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press
Anthony L. Brueckner (2001). Chalmers' Conceivability Argument for Dualism. Analysis 61 (3):187-193.
Terence Rajivan Edward (2012). The Dualism of Conceptual Scheme and Undifferentiated Reality. E-Logos 19:2-8.
Wolfram Hinzen (2006). Dualism and the Atoms of Thought. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (9):25-55.
E. Diaz-Leon (2009). How Many Explanatory Gaps Are There? APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 8 (2):33-35.
Daniel Kostić (forthcoming). Explanatory Perspectivalism: Limiting the Scope of the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Topoi:1-7.
Janet Levin (2002). Is Conceptual Analysis Needed for the Reduction of Qualitative States? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):571-591.
Michael Silberstein (2001). Converging on Emergence: Consciousness, Causation and Explanation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (9-10):61-98.
Frederick B. Mills (2001). A Spinozist Approach to the Conceptual Gap in Consciousness Studies. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (1):91-101.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads1,050 ( #279 of 1,792,245 )
Recent downloads (6 months)77 ( #8,007 of 1,792,245 )
How can I increase my downloads?