David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):387-394 (2007)
Epistemic contextualism (EC) is primarily a semantic view, viz. the view that ‘knowledge’-ascriptions can change their contents with the conversational context. To be more precise, EC is the view that the predicate ‘know’ has an unstable Kaplan character, i.e. a character that does not map all contexts on the same content. According to EC, ‘know’ is thus an indexical expression. Notwithstanding this purely linguistic characterisation of EC, contextualists have traditionally argued that their views have considerable philosophical impact, this being due to the alleged fact that their linguistic views about ‘know’ provide the resources for a resolution of sceptical puzzles. In this paper I will address an objection to EC claiming that, as a linguistic view about the term ‘know’, EC cannot be of any epistemological significance.
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1996). Elusive Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Stewart Cohen (1999). Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):57-89.
Stewart Cohen (1988). How to Be a Fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.
Ernest Sosa (2000). Skepticism and Contextualism. Noûs 34 (s1):1-18.
Hilary Kornblith (2000). The Contextualist Evasion of Epistemology. Noûs 34 (s1):24 - 32.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Martin Montminy (2007). Epistemic Contextualism and the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction. Synthese 155 (1):99 - 125.
Thomas Grundmann (2004). Inferential Contextualism, Epistemological Realism and Scepticism: Comments on Williams. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):345 - 352.
Sarah Wright (2010). Virtues, Social Roles, and Contextualism. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):95-114.
Michael Blome-Tillmann (2008). The Indexicality of 'Knowledge'. Philosophical Studies 138 (1):29 - 53.
Elke Brendel (2005). Why Contextualists Cannot Know They Are Right: Self-Refuting Implications of Contextualism. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 20 (2):38-55.
Wolfgang Freitag (2011). Epistemic Contextualism and the Knowability Problem. Acta Analytica 26 (3):273-284.
Michael Blome-Tillmann (2012). Presuppositional Epistemic Contextualism and the Problem of Known Presuppositions. In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), New Essays on Knowledge Ascriptions. OUP 104-119.
Robin McKenna (2011). Interests Contextualism. Philosophia 39 (4):741-750.
Frank Hofmann (2004). Why Epistemic Contextualism Does Not Provide an Adequate Account of Knowledge: Comments on Barke. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):375 - 382.
Elke Brendel & Christoph Jäger (2004). Contextualist Approaches to Epistemology: Problems and Prospects. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):143 - 172.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads177 ( #21,285 of 1,934,933 )
Recent downloads (6 months)34 ( #16,630 of 1,934,933 )
How can I increase my downloads?