Contextualism and the Epistemological Enterprise

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):387-394 (2007)
Epistemic contextualism (EC) is primarily a semantic view, viz. the view that ‘knowledge’-ascriptions can change their contents with the conversational context. To be more precise, EC is the view that the predicate ‘know’ has an unstable Kaplan character, i.e. a character that does not map all contexts on the same content. According to EC, ‘know’ is thus an indexical expression. Notwithstanding this purely linguistic characterisation of EC, contextualists have traditionally argued that their views have considerable philosophical impact, this being due to the alleged fact that their linguistic views about ‘know’ provide the resources for a resolution of sceptical puzzles. In this paper I will address an objection to EC claiming that, as a linguistic view about the term ‘know’, EC cannot be of any epistemological significance.
Keywords epistemic contextualism
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DOI 10.2307/20619365
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PhilPapers Archive Michael Blome-Tillmann, Contextualism and the Epistemological Enterprise
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1996). Elusive Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Stewart Cohen (1988). How to Be a Fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.

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