Ideals and monisms: recent criticisms of the Strong Programme in the sociology of knowledge

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References found in this work BETA
D. Bloor (1999). Anti-Latour. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 30 (1):81-112.
David Bloor (1992). Left and Right Wittgensteinians. In Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as Practice and Culture. University of Chicago Press. 270.
David Bloor (2005). Toward a Sociology of Epistemic Things. Perspectives on Science 13 (3):285-312.
David Bloor (1973). Wittgenstein and Mannheim on the Sociology of Mathematics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 4 (2):173-191.

View all 14 references

Citations of this work BETA
Stephen Kemp (2007). Concepts, Anomalies and Reality: A Response to Bloor and Fehér. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (1):241-253.
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Barbara Tuchańska (1990). Can Relativism Be Reconciled with Realism and Causalism? International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (3):285-294.
Finn Collin (2008). The Strong Programme. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 43:43-49.
Peter Slezak (1991). Bloor's Bluff: Behaviourism and the Strong Programme. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (3):241 – 256.
Adrian Haddock (2004). Rethinking the “Strong Programme” in the Sociology of Knowledge. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 35 (1):19-40.
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