Ideals and monisms: recent criticisms of the Strong Programme in the sociology of knowledge

Abstract
I offer a reply to criticisms of the Strong Programme presented by Stephen Kemp who develops some new lines of argument that focus on the ‘monism’ of the programme. He says the programme should be rejected for three reasons. First, because it embodies ‘weak idealism’, that is, its supporters effectively sever the link between language and the world. Second, it challenges the reasons that scientists offer in explanation of their own beliefs. Third, it destroys the distinction between successful and unsuccessful instrumental action. Kemp is careful to produce quotations from the supporters of the programme as evidence to support his case. All three points deserve and are given a detailed response and the interpretation of the quoted material plays a significant role in the discussion. My hope is that careful exegesis will offset the numerous misinterpretations that are current in the philosophical literature. Particular attention is paid to what is said about the normative standards involved in the application of empirical concepts. The operation of these standards in the face of the negotiability of all concepts is explored and misapprehensions on the topic are corrected. The work of Wittgenstein, Popper, Kuhn and Hesse is used to illustrate these themes.Keywords: Strong Programme; Social constructionism; Idealism; Monism; Finitism; Relativism
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 13,970
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
D. Bloor (1999). Anti-Latour. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 30 (1):81-112.
David Bloor (1992). Left and Right Wittgensteinians. In Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as Practice and Culture. University of Chicago Press. 270.
David Bloor (2005). Toward a Sociology of Epistemic Things. Perspectives on Science 13 (3):285-312.
David Bloor (1973). Wittgenstein and Mannheim on the Sociology of Mathematics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 4 (2):173-191.

View all 14 references

Citations of this work BETA
Stephen Kemp (2007). Concepts, Anomalies and Reality: A Response to Bloor and Fehér. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (1):241-253.
Similar books and articles
Edward Manier (1980). Levels of Reflexivity: Unnoted Differences Within the "Strong Programme" in the Sociology of Knowledge. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:197 - 207.
Angelo M. Petroni (1993). Conventionalism, Scientific Discovery and the Sociology of Knowledge. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (3):225 – 240.
Barbara Tuchańska (1990). Can Relativism Be Reconciled with Realism and Causalism? International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (3):285-294.
Finn Collin (2008). The Strong Programme. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 43:43-49.
Peter Slezak (1991). Bloor's Bluff: Behaviourism and the Strong Programme. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (3):241 – 256.
Adrian Haddock (2004). Rethinking the “Strong Programme” in the Sociology of Knowledge. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 35 (1):19-40.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-09-02

Total downloads

34 ( #70,554 of 1,696,172 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #333,716 of 1,696,172 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.