Mind 118 (470):241 - 294 (2009)
|Abstract||The paper explicates a new way to model the context-sensitivity of 'knows', namely a way that suggests a close connection between the content of 'knows' in a context C and what is pragmatically presupposed in C. After explicating my new approach in the first half of the paper and arguing that it is explanatorily superior to standard accounts of epistemic contextualism, the paper points, in its second half, to some interesting new features of the emerging account, such as its compatibility with the intuitions of Moorean dogmatists. Finally, the paper shows that the account defended is not subject to the most prominent and familiar philosophical objections to epistemic contextualism discussed in the recent literature|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Michael Blome-Tillmann (2009). Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, and the Interaction of 'Knowledge'-Ascriptions with Modal and Temporal Operators. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):315-331.
Jonathan Ichikawa (2011). Quantifiers and Epistemic Contextualism. Philosophical Studies 155 (3):383-398.
Frank Hofmann (2004). Why Epistemic Contextualism Does Not Provide an Adequate Account of Knowledge: Comments on Barke. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):375 - 382.
Michael Blome-Tillmann (2008). The Indexicality of 'Knowledge'. Philosophical Studies 138 (1):29 - 53.
Michael Blome-Tillmann (2009). Contextualism, Safety and Epistemic Relevance. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):383-394.
Michael Blome-Tillmann (2012). Contextualism and the Knowledge Norms. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):89-100.
Michael Blome-Tillmann (2012). Presuppositional Epistemic Contextualism and the Problem of Known Presuppositions. In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), New Essays on Knowledge Ascriptions. OUP.
Martin Montminy (2007). Epistemic Contextualism and the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction. Synthese 155 (1):99 - 125.
Added to index2009-01-30
Total downloads69 ( #12,610 of 549,087 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #19,228 of 549,087 )
How can I increase my downloads?