Paradox and cross purposes in recent work on consciousness
Cognition 79 (1):197-219 (2001)
| Abstract | Dehaene and Naccache, Dennett and Jack and Shallice “see convergence coming from many different quarters on a version of the neuronal global workspace model†(Dennett, p. 1). (Boldface references are to papers in this volume.) On the contrary, even within this volume, there are commitments to very different perspectives on consciousness. And these differing perspectives are based on tacit differences in philosophical starting places that should be made explicit.  Indeed, it is not clear that different uses of “consciousness†and “awareness†in this volume can be taken to refer to the same phenomenon. More specifically, I think there are three different concepts of consciousness in play in this issue. The global workspace model makes much more sense on one of these than on the others | |||||||||
| Keywords | *Consciousness States | |||||||||
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