David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cognition 79 (1-2):197-219 (2001)
Dehaene and Naccache, Dennett and Jack and Shallice â€œsee convergence coming from many different quarters on a version of the neuronal global workspace modelâ€ (Dennett, p. 1).Â (Boldface references are to papers in this volume.)Â On the contrary, even within this volume, there are commitments to very different perspectives on consciousness.Â And these differing perspectives are based on tacit differences in philosophical starting places that should be made explicit.Â Â Indeed, it is not clear that different uses of â€œconsciousnessâ€ and â€œawarenessâ€ in this volume can be taken to refer to the same phenomenon.Â More specifically, I think there are three different concepts of consciousness in play in this issue.Â The global workspace model makes much more sense on one of these than on the others
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Ned Block (2011). Perceptual Consciousness Overflows Cognitive Access. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (12):567-575.
Ned Block (2007). Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.
Ned Block (2013). The Grain of Vision and the Grain of Attention. Thought, A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):170-184.
Daniel M. Haybron (2007). Do We Know How Happy We Are? On Some Limits of Affective Introspection and Recall. Noûs 41 (3):394–428.
Pär Sundström (2007). Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot. Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.
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