The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates

MIT Press (1997)
" -- "New Scientist" Intended for anyone attempting to find their way through the large and confusingly interwoven philosophical literature on consciousness, ..
Keywords Consciousness  Content  Experience  Knowledge  Metaphysics  Neuroscience  Psychology  Qualia  Science
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ISBN(s) 9780262522106   0262522101  
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Uriah Kriegel (2005). Naturalizing Subjective Character. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):23-57.
Jim Stone (2005). Why There Still Are No People. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):174-191.

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David J. Chalmers (1997). Availability: The Cognitive Basis of Experience? In Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press 148-149.

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