Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):23-43 (2000)
|Abstract||The ancient Greeks almost universally accepted the thesis that virtues are skills. Skills have an underlying intellectual structure (logos), and having a particular skill entails understanding the relevant logos, possessing a general ability to diagnose and solve problems (phronesis), as well as having appropriate experience. Two implications of accepting this thesis for moral epistemology and epistemology in general are considered. Thinking of virtues as skills yields a viable virtue epistemology in which moral knowledge is a species of a general kind of knowledge that is not philosophically suspect. Also, the debate between internalists and externalists in epistemology is subversively resolved. (edited).|
|Keywords||epistemology, ETHICS, knowledge, skill, virtue|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Robert Campbell Roberts (2007). Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Jason S. Baehr (2006). Character in Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 128 (3):479--514.
Duncan Pritchard (2005). Virtue Epistemology and the Acquisition of Knowledge. Philosophical Explorations 8 (3):229 – 243.
Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (1996). Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
Jason S. Baehr (2011). The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Christoph Kelp (2011). In Defence of Virtue Epistemology. Synthese 179:409-33.
Matt Stichter (2007). Ethical Expertise: The Skill Model of Virtue. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (2):183 - 194.
Guy Axtell (1997). Recent Work on Virtue Epistemology. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):1 - 26.
Heather Battaly (2008). Virtue Epistemology. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):639-663.
Jason Baehr (2006). Character, Reliability and Virtue Epistemology. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):193–212.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads87 ( #8,270 of 549,037 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,272 of 549,037 )
How can I increase my downloads?