Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions
Routledge (1997)
| Abstract | David Bloor's challenging new evaluation of Wittgenstein's account of rules and rule-following brings together the rare combination of philosophical and sociological viewpoints. Wittgenstein enigmatically claimed that the way we follow rules is an "institution" without ever explaining what he meant by this term. Wittgenstein's contribution to the debate has since been subject to sharply opposed interpretations by "collectivist" and "individualist" readings by philosophers; in the light of this controversy, Bloor argues convincingly for a collectivist, sociological understanding of Wittgenstein's later work. Accessible and simply written, this book provides the first consistent sociological reading of Wittgenstein's work for many years | |||||||||
| Keywords | Epistemology Institution Knowledge Rule Scepticism Wittgenstein | |||||||||
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| Buy the book | $38.26 new (17% off) $42.26 direct from Amazon (9% off) Amazon page | |||||||||
| Call number | B3376.W564.B6 1997 | |||||||||
| ISBN(s) | 0415161487 9780415161473 0415161479 9780415161480 | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesDaniel Whiting (2010). Particular and General: Wittgenstein, Linguistic Rules, and Context. In Daniel Whiting (ed.), The Later Wittgenstein on Language. Palgrave Macmillan.
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Adam M. Croom (2010). Wittgenstein, Kripke, and the Rule Following Paradox. Dialogue 52 (3):103-109.
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