David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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David Bloor's challenging new evaluation of Wittgenstein's account of rules and rule-following brings together the rare combination of philosophical and sociological viewpoints. Wittgenstein enigmatically claimed that the way we follow rules is an "institution" without ever explaining what he meant by this term. Wittgenstein's contribution to the debate has since been subject to sharply opposed interpretations by "collectivist" and "individualist" readings by philosophers; in the light of this controversy, Bloor argues convincingly for a collectivist, sociological understanding of Wittgenstein's later work. Accessible and simply written, this book provides the first consistent sociological reading of Wittgenstein's work for many years
|Keywords||Epistemology Institution Knowledge Rule Scepticism Wittgenstein|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$19.15 used (88% off) $41.99 new (16% off) $45.96 direct from Amazon (8% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||B3376.W564.B6 1997|
|ISBN(s)||0415161487 9780415161473 0415161479 9780415161480|
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Citations of this work BETA
Andrea Guardo (2012). Kripke's Account of the Rule-Following Considerations. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):366-388.
James Connelly (2012). Meaning is Normative: A Response to Hattiangadi. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 27 (1):55-71.
Mark Addis (2013). Linguistic Competence and Expertise. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (2):327-336.
Bernhard Nickel (2013). Dynamics, Brandom-Style. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):333-354.
Jeff Kochan (2009). The Exception Makes the Rule: Reply to Howson. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):213-216.
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