David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):522-538 (2009)
The possibilities of depicting non-existents, depicting non-particulars and depictive misrepresentation are frequently cited as grounds for denying the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance. I first argue that these problems are really a manifestation of the more general problem of intentionality. I then show how there is a plausible solution to the general problem of intentionality which is consonant with the platitude.
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References found in this work BETA
Nelson Goodman (1968). Languages of Art. Bobbs-Merrill.
Robert Hopkins (1998). Picture, Image and Experience: A Philosophical Inquiry. Cambridge University Press.
Robert Hopkins (1994). Resemblance and Misrepresentation. Mind 103 (412):421-438.
John Hyman (2006). The Objective Eye. University of Chicago Press.
David Kaplan (1968). Quantifying In. Synthese 19 (1-2):178-214.
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