David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 94 (2):145-169 (1993)
Since the most promising path to a solution to the problem of skepticism regarding perceptual knowledge seems to rest on a sharp distinction between perceiving and inferring, I begin by clarifying and defending that distinction. Next, I discuss the chief obstacle to success by this path, the difficulty in making the required distinction between merely logical possibilities that one is mistaken and the real (Austin) or relevant (Dretske) possibilities which would exclude knowledge. I argue that this distinction cannot be drawn in the ways Austin and Dretske suggest without begging the questions at issue. Finally, I sketch and defend a more radical way of identifying relevant possibilities that is inspired by Austin's controversial suggestion of a parallel between saying I know and saying I promise: a claim of knowledge of some particular matter is relative to a context in which questions about the matter have been raised
|Keywords||Epistemology Knowledge Perception Relativism Scepticism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Douglas James McDermid (2001). What is Direct Perceptual Knowledge? A Fivefold Confusion. Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):1-16.
Alan Millar (2012). Scepticism, Perceptual Knowledge, and Doxastic Responsibility. Synthese 189 (2):353-372.
Marcus P. Adams (2009). Empirical Evidence and the Knowledge-That/Knowledge-How Distinction. Synthese 170 (1):97 - 114.
John L. Pollock (1970). Perceptual Knowledge. Philosophical Review 80 (3):287-319.
Huiming Ren (2012). The Distinction Between Knowledge-That and Knowledge-How. Philosophia 40 (4):857-875.
Jonathan Schaffer (2003). Perceptual Knowledge Derailed. Philosophical Studies 112 (1):31-45.
Douglas J. McDermid (2001). What is Direct Perceptual Knowledge? A Fivefold Confusion. Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):1-16.
Duncan Pritchard (2010). Relevant Alternatives, Perceptual Knowledge and Discrimination. Noûs 44 (2):245-268.
Steven Luper (2006). Dretske on Knowledge Closure. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):379 – 394.
Jonathan Dancy (ed.) (1988). Perceptual Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads64 ( #23,795 of 1,102,949 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #36,687 of 1,102,949 )
How can I increase my downloads?