Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):217-238 (2002)
|Abstract||ABSTRACT: Recently a bold and admirable interpretation of Chrysippus’ position on the Sorites has been presented, suggesting that Chrysippus offered a solution to the Sorites by (i) taking an epistemicist position1 which (ii) made allowances for higher-order vagueness.2 In this paper I argue (i) that Chrysippus did not take an epistemicist position, but − if any − a non-epistemic one which denies truth-values to some cases in a Sorites-series, and (ii) that it is uncertain whether and how he made allowances for higher-order vagueness, but if he did, this was not grounded on an epistemicist position|
|Keywords||vagueness epistemicism sorites paradox Williamson stoic logic ancient logic|
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