Chrysippus and the epistemic theory of vagueness

Abstract
ABSTRACT: Recently a bold and admirable interpretation of Chrysippus’ position on the Sorites has been presented, suggesting that Chrysippus offered a solution to the Sorites by (i) taking an epistemicist position1 which (ii) made allowances for higher-order vagueness. In this paper I argue (i) that Chrysippus did not take an epistemicist position, but − if any − a non-epistemic one which denies truth-values to some cases in a Sorites-series, and (ii) that it is uncertain whether and how he made allowances for higher-order vagueness, but if he did, this was not grounded on an epistemicist position
Keywords vagueness  epistemicism  sorites paradox  Williamson  stoic logic  ancient logic
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Citations of this work BETA
Roy Sorensen (2005). Précis of Vagueness and Contradiction. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):678–685.
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