Online research in philosophy

Although the theory of Jean Piaget is correctly characterized as genetic epistemology, its nature and scope remain unclear and controversial. An examination of Piaget's Introduction a l'epistemologie genetique indicates that Piaget relies heavily upon a model of comparative anatomy and, consequently, that genetic epistemology is about both the history of science and individual development. This biological model seems to be the basis for Piaget's view that the history of science can be seen as a (Kantian) history of scientific concepts whereas psychogenetic development is a history of these very same concepts on the individual level. Finally, although there are passages indicating a different interpretation of the scope of genetic epistemology, I give several reasons for preferring the more liberal interpretation.

The guiding idea of Patricia Kitcher's Freud's Dream is that the use of interdisciplinary methodology accounts at the same time for the most central features of Freud's theory of the mind and for its most serious shortcomings. Kitcher proposes to provide an account of Freud's theory that illuminates its interdisciplinary underpinnings. While she indisputably succeeds in providing a subtle and rich reconstruction of Freud's work, her attempt to show up the limitations of interdisciplinary studies does not work. The value of her account is attributable not to the idea that Freud's was a flawed interdisciplinary endeavour but to a contextually and historically sensitive approach that makes explicit and elucidates the norms of explanation at work in his method of theory construction and that takes into account the multifaceted nature of his scientific practice.

The founder of the profession of interdisciplinary studies revisits the intellectual odyssey he undertook in developing a theory of interdisciplinary studies, which eventually led him to complex systems theory. The precise relationship between complex systems and interdisciplinary studies is probed and the implications of that relationship for both theories are critically examined.

In the paper we will explore some of the major limits and possibilities of interdisciplinary research into law. In how far is the science of law open to insights from other disciplines, such as sociology, psychology, philosophy, economics and literature studies? We will approach this question by confronting two contrary positions: pragmatism (Dewey) that argues for the fundamental comparability and compatibility of theories on the one hand and positivism (Kelsen and Luhmann) that points to the limits thereof on the other. Following on this debate, we will present a dynamic model of interdisciplinarity in which different types of interdisciplinary legal research will be presented, moving from the monodisciplinary towards a fully integrated interdisciplinary perspective. Finally, the advantages and disadvantages of each type of interdisciplinary research into law will be discussed.

It is argued that fundamental to Piaget''s life works is a biologically based naturalism in which the living world is a nested complex of self-regulating, self-organising (constructing) adaptive systems. A structuralist-rationalist overlay on this core position is distinguished and it is shown how it may be excised without significant loss of content or insight. A new and richer conception of the nature of Piaget''s genetic epistemology emerges, one which enjoys rich interrelationships with evolutionary epistemology. These are explored and it is shown how a regulatory systems evolutionary epistemology may be embedded within genetic epistemology.

This paper presents some perspectives in contemporary epistemology, relating in particular to the links between contextualism and interdisciplinary approaches. The author considers the role played by different theories of context in the frame of a social epistemology.

This paper concerns Jean Piaget's (1896–1980) philosophy of science and, in particular, the picture of scientific development suggested by his theory of genetic epistemology. The aims of the paper are threefold: (1) to examine genetic epistemology as a theory concerning the growth of knowledge both in the individual and in science; (2) to explicate Piaget's view of ‘scientific progress’, which is grounded in his theory of equilibration; and (3) to juxtapose Piaget's notion of progress with Thomas Kuhn's (1922–1996). Issues of scientific continuity, scientific realism and scientific rationality are discussed. It is argued that Piaget's view highlights weaknesses in Kuhn's ‘discontinuous’ picture of scientific change.