David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Economics and Philosophy 24 (2):167-189 (2008)
Some empirical findings seem to show that people value health benefits differently depending on the age of the beneficiary. Health economists and philosophers have offered justifications for these preferences on grounds of both efficiency and equity. In this paper, I examine the most prominent examples of both sorts of justification: the defence of age-weighting in the WHO's global burden of disease studies and the fair innings argument. I argue that neither sort of justification has been worked out in satisfactory form: age should not be taken into account in the framework of the burden of disease measure, and on the most promising formulations of the fair innings argument, it turns out to be merely an indicator of some other factor. I conclude by describing the role of age in theories of justice of healthcare resource allocation
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References found in this work BETA
Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
Norman Daniels (1985). Just Health Care. Cambridge University Press.
Norman Daniels (1996). Justice and Justification: Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice. Cambridge University Press.
John Broome (1999). Ethics Out of Economics. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Samuel J. Kerstein & Greg Bognar (2010). Complete Lives in the Balance. American Journal of Bioethics 10 (4):37 – 45.
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