Analysing causality: The opposite of counterfactual is factual
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):3 – 26 (2004)
| Abstract | Using Jim Woodward's Counterfactual Dependency account as an example, I argue that causal claims about indeterministic systems cannot be satisfactorily analysed as including counterfactual conditionals among their truth conditions because the counterfactuals such accounts must appeal to need not have truth values. Where this happens, counterfactual analyses transform true causal claims into expressions which are not true. | |||||||||
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