Content and Justification: Philosophical Papers

Oup Oxford (2008)
Abstract
This volume presents a series of influential essays by Paul Boghossian on the theory of content and on its relation to the phenomenon of a priori knowledge. The essays are organized under four headings: the nature of content; content and self-knowledge; knowledge, content, and the a priori; and colour concepts
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ISBN(s) 9780199292103
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Citations of this work BETA
Paul Boghossian (2012). What is Inference? Philosophical Studies (1):1-18.
Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Is Intuition Based On Understanding? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):42-67.
Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2010). Unreasonable Knowledge. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):1-21.
John Broome (2012). Comments on Boghossian. Philosophical Studies (1):1-7.

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Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (1994). The Supervenience of Mental Content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 68:117-135.
Paul A. Boghossian (1997). What the Externalist Can Know A Priori. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (2):161-75.
Curtis Brown, Narrow Mental Content. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
James Baillie (1997). Personal Identity and Mental Content. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):323-33.
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