Content and self-knowledge

In Christopher S. Hill (ed.), Philosophy of Mind. University of Arkansas Press. 5--26 (1989)
Abstract
This paper argues that, given a certain apparently inevitable thesis about content, we could not know our own minds. The thesis is that the content of a thought is determined by its relational properties
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Citations of this work BETA
T. Parent (2007). Infallibilism About Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 133 (3):411-424.
Quassim Cassam (2011). Knowing What You Believe. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):1-23.

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