Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (June):687-700 (1989)
|Abstract||If there is a dogma in the contemporary philosophy of the cognitive mind, it must be the notion that cognition is semantic causation or, differently put, that it is semantics that runs the psyche. This is what the notion of psychosemantics and (often) intentionality are all about. Another dogma, less widespread than the first but almost equally potent, is that common sense psychology is the implicit theory of psychosemantics. The two dogmas are jointly encapsulated in the following axiom. Mental attitudes such as beliefs and desires have essentially semantic contents, or are semantically evaluable. (This is why they are called propositional attitudes.) Mental attitudes have causal powers in virtue of their semantic properties. The content of an attitude has causal powers qua semantic, or more exactly in virtue of its syntactic structure which reflects relevant semantic properties and relations. (Propositions attitudinized cause in virtue of their semantically sensitive syntax.) It is the fact that mental attitudes cause in virtue of being semantic that explains why the cognitive mind is essentially semantic and why common sense psychology is implicitly true of the semantic mind.|
|Keywords||Metaphysics Mind Psyche Semantics Fodor, J|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
David Braun (2006). Kripke's Revenge. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 128 (3):669 - 682.
Scott Soames (2008). Why Propositions Cannot Be Sets of Truth-Supporting Circumstances. Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (3):267 - 276.
Yael Ravin (1990). Lexical Semantics Without Thematic Roles. Oxford University Press.
William J. Rapaport (2003). What Did You Mean by That? Misunderstanding, Negotiation, and Syntactic Semantics. Minds and Machines 13 (3):397-427.
Gerald J. Massey (1990). Semantic Holism is Seriously False. Studia Logica 49 (1):83 - 86.
Pierre Jacob (1997). What Minds Can Do: Intentionality in a Non-Intentional World. Cambridge University Press.
Josefa Toribio (2002). Semantic Responsibility. Philosophical Explorations 1 (1):39-58.
Eric Dietrich (1989). Semantics and the Computational Paradigm in Computational Psychology. Synthese 79 (April):119-41.
Theodore Sider & David Braun (2006). Review: Kripke's Revenge. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 128 (3):669 - 682.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads31 ( #44,839 of 733,590 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #36,864 of 733,590 )
How can I increase my downloads?