Epistemological custard pies from functional brain imaging

Philosophy of Science 69 (3):S59-S71 (2002)
This paper discusses features of an epistemically valuable form of evidence that raise troubles for received and new epistemological treatments of experimental evidence
Keywords Brain  Evidence  Experiment  Functional  Imaging  Science
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DOI 10.1086/341768
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Deborah G. Mayo (2001). Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (1):455-459.

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