How are objective epistemic reasons possible?

Philosophical Studies 106 (1-2):340-380 (2001)
Abstract
Epistemic relativism has the contemporary academy in its grip. Not merely in the United States, but seemingly everywhere, most scholars working in the humanities and the social sciences seem to subscribe to some form of it. Even where the label is repudiated, the view is embraced. Sometimes the relativism in question concerns truth, sometimes justification. The core impulse appears to be a relativism about knowledge. The suspicion is widespread that what counts as knowledge in one cultural, or broadly ideological, setting need not count as knowledge in another.
Keywords Relativism  Objectivity  Epistemology
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Niko Kolodny (2007). How Does Coherence Matter? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):229 - 263.
Hartry Field (2009). Epistemology Without Metaphysics. Philosophical Studies 143 (2):249 - 290.
David Enoch & Joshua Schechter (2008). How Are Basic Belief-Forming Methods Justified? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):547–579.

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