Inferentialism and the Epistemology of Logic: Reflections on Casalegno and Williamson

Dialectica 66 (2):221-236 (2012)
Abstract
I defend an inferential account of the logical constants against objections made to it by Paolo Casalegno and Timothy Williamson
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References found in this work BETA
Paul Boghossian (2003). Blind Reasoning. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):225–248.

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Dylan Dodd (2007). Why Williamson Should Be a Sceptic. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):635–649.
Tuomas E. Tahko (2012). Counterfactuals and Modal Epistemology. Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):93–115.
Florian Steinberger (2011). Why Conclusions Should Remain Single. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (3):333-355.
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