Inferentialism and the Epistemology of Logic: Reflections on Casalegno and Williamson

Dialectica 66 (2):221-236 (2012)
I defend an inferential account of the logical constants against objections made to it by Paolo Casalegno and Timothy Williamson.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2012.01303.x
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References found in this work BETA
Paul Boghossian (2003). Blind Reasoning. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):225–248.

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