Must there be a top level?

Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):193-201 (2009)
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Abstract

I first explore the notion of the world's being such that everything in it is a proper part. I then explore the notion of the world's being such that everything in it both is and has a proper part. Given two well recognized assumptions, I argue that both notions represent genuine metaphysical possibilities. Finally I consider, but dismiss, some possible objections.

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Einar Duenger Bohn
University Of Agder

Citations of this work

Fundamentality.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Mereology.Achille C. Varzi - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Metaphysical Interdependence.Naomi Thompson - 2016 - In Mark Jago (ed.), Reality Making. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 38-56.
Ordinary objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Monism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Is there a fundamental level?Jonathan Schaffer - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):498–517.
Theories of Location.Josh Parsons - 2007 - In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 3. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 201-232.
Van Inwagen and the Possibility of Gunk.Theodore Sider - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):285 - 289.
The contingency of composition.Ross P. Cameron - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):99-121.

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