Online research in philosophy

Many philosophers have held that it is not possible to experience a spatial object, property, or relation except against the background of an intact awareness of a space that is somehow ‘absolute’. This paper challenges that claim, by analyzing in detail the case of a brain-damaged subject whose visual experiences seem to have violated this condition: spatial objects and properties were present in his visual experience, but space itself was not. I go on to suggest that phenomenological argumentation can give us a kind of evidence about the nature of the mind even if this evidence is not absolutely incorrigible.

Interpretation of the development of merleau-ponty's attitude toward phenomenological reflection. first, ``the phenomenology of perception'' is shown to be a critique of the transcendental idealism of husserl's works prior to the ``crisis''. second, ``the visible and the invisible'' is shown to be an imminent critique of the ``lifeworld phenomenology'' of the ``crisis'' and of ``the phenomenology of perception'', leading to the view that phenomenological reflection, like reflective philosophy in general, must be superseded by a new approach which would articulate our truly immediate relation with the world.

Husserl’s and Carnap’s Theories of Space ABSTRACT: Usually we do not connect theoretical approaches that of Edmund Husserl and of Rudolf Carnap. The fact of writing by Carnap some of his early works under the strong influence of the founder of phenomenological school is still not well-known. In the paper, at the beginning I arrange some terminological questions concerning space and then having described shortly Husserlian theory of space (including especially theory of perceiving of space by a subject), I show Carnapian different and changeable attempts to explain problems of structure of space(s) and of structure of our spatial experience(s) (from his dissertation called Der Raum to Der Logische Aufbau der Welt). Then I try to gather all the terminological and methodological similarities between Carnapian and Husserlian approaches. My general thesis is following: Carnapian early works are logistic criticism of Husserlian phenomenology of space.

Husserl left many unpublished drafts explaining (or trying to) his views on spatial representation and geometry, such as, particularly, those collected in the second part of Studien zur Arithmetik und Geometrie (Hua XXI), but no completely articulate work on the subject. In this paper, I put forward an interpretation of what those views might have been. Husserl, I claim, distinguished among different conceptions of space, the space of perception (constituted from sensorial data by intentionally motivated psychic functions), that of physical geometry (or idealized perceptual space), the space of the mathematical science of physical nature (in which science, not only raw perception has a word) and the abstract spaces of mathematics (free creations of the mathematical mind), each of them with its peculiar geometrical structure. Perceptual space is proto-Euclidean and the space of physical geometry Euclidean, but mathematical physics, Husserl allowed, may find it convenient to represent physical space with a non-Euclidean structure. Mathematical spaces, on their turn, can be endowed, he thinks, with any geometry mathematicians may find interesting. Many other related questions are addressed here, in particular those concerning the a priori or a posteriori character of the many geometric features of perceptual space (bearing in mind that there are at least two different notions of a priori in Husserl, which we may call the conceptual and the transcendental a priori). I conclude with an overview of Weyl’s ideas on the matter, since his philosophical conceptions are often traceable back to his former master, Husserl.

Translator's introduction -- Fundamental questions of geometry -- The decidability requirement -- The origin of the concept of number -- Implicit definition and the proper grounding of mathematics -- Rigid bodies in geometry -- Prelude to geometry : the essential ideas -- Physical and mathematical geometry -- Natural geometry -- The concept of the differential -- Reflections on the proper grounding of mathematics I -- Concepts and proofs in mathematics -- Dimension and space in mathematics -- Reflections on the proper grounding of mathematics II -- The axiomatic method in modern mathematics.

It is a study of the phenomenological philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger. Through a critical discussion including practically all previously published English and German literature on the subject, the aim is to present a thorough and evenhanded account of the relation between the two. The book provides a detailed presentation of their respective projects and methods, and examines several of their key phenomenological analyses, centering on the phenomenon of being-in-the-world. It offers new perspectives on Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology, e.g. concerning the importance of Husserl's phenomenology of the body, the relationship between the Husserlian concept of "constitution" and Heidegger's notion of "transcendence", as well as in its argument that "being" designates the central phenomenon for both phenomenologists. Though the study sacrifices nothing in terms of argumentative rigor or interpretative detail, it is written in such a way as to be accessible and rewarding to non-specialists and specialists alike.

The relation of merleau-ponty's work to husserlian phenomenology continues to be a matter of discussion and disagreement. since merleau- ponty considered the doctrine of reduction the ultimate notion in husserl's philosophy, this paper attempts to clarify the relationship of the two thinkers by contrasting their theories of the reduction. such a study indicates that the transcendental sphere achieved by merleau-ponty's reduction is decisively different from that of husserl. hence his philosophy is best understood as the development of a new transcendental philosophy rather than a modification of the original husserlian phenomenology.

INTRODUCTION Phenomenology as transcendental phenomenology is centered in a description of meaning interpreted in relationship to acts of consciousness. ...

In this thesis, I investigate the nature of geometric knowledge and its relationship to spatial intuition. My goal is to rehabilitate the Kantian view that Euclid's geometry is a mathematical practice, which is grounded in spatial intuition, yet, nevertheless, yields a type of a priori knowledge about the structure of visual space. I argue for this by showing that Euclid's geometry allows us to derive knowledge from idealized visual objects, i.e., idealized diagrams by means of non-formal logical inferences. By developing such an account of Euclid's geometry, I complete the "standard view" that geometry is either a formal system (pure geometry) or an empirical science (applied geometry), which was developed mainly by the logical positivists and which is currently accepted by many mathematicians and philosophers. My thesis is divided into three parts. I use Hans Reichenbach's arguments against Kant and Edmund Husserl's genetic approach to the concept of space as a means of arguing that the "standard view" has to be supplemented by a concept of a geometry whose propositions have genuine spatial content. I then develop a coherent interpretation of Euclid's method by investigating both the subject matter of Euclid's geometry and the nature of geometric inferences. In the final part of this thesis, I modify Husserl's phenomenological analysis of the constitution of visual space in order to define a concept of spatial intuition that allows me not only to explain how Euclid's practice is grounded in visual space, but also to account for the apriority of its results.

Some issues heavily debated in perception sciences are presented: the explanatory gap and the experience measurement problem. The experimental phenomenology is said to provide substantive contribution to settle controversy over the phenome- nological adequacy of perception theory and models. An interpretation of experi- mental phenomenology as explanation of the perceptual manifold, and definition of relation varieties to eventually map onto other perception sciences’ domains is sketched.