Graduate studies at Western
Noûs 30 (2):174-196 (1996)
|Abstract||I will argue that this intuitive description is in fact accurate: that we can and do perform actions we know to be wrong simply because we fail to decide what to do. I will then try to show that once we recognize this fact, we can identify a character trait which any plausible moral theory which is not strictly self-defeating must require that we develop. Finally, I will sketch some implications of this argument for the role of virtue in moral theory, and for the nature of moral objectivity.|
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