Hempel's Dilemma and domains of physics

Analysis 71 (4):646-651 (2011)
Hempel's Dilemma is the claim that physicalism is an ill-formed thesis because it can offer no account of the physics that it refers to: current physics will be discarded in the future, and we don't yet know the nature of future physics. This article confronts the first horn of the dilemma, and argues that our knowledge of current physics is sufficient for offering a physicalist ontology of the mind. We have good scientific evidence that future physics will be irrelevant to the mind-body problem because mental processes lie safely within the well-understood domains of applicability of current physical theories.
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anr087
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