Putting zombies to rest: The role of dynamics in reduction
| Abstract | I argue that property dualism is not supported by the purported logical possibility of qualitative zombies. Chalmers | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesKarol Polcyn (2006). Conceivability, Possibility, and a Posteriori Necessity: On Chalmers' Argument for Dualism. Diametros 7 (March):37-55.
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Yujin Nagasawa (2008). Review of Kirk's Zombies and Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 49:170-171.
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