An image for the unity of will in duns scotus

Scotus argues that the will of a rational agent has two basic inclinations: for benefit and for justice. Having examined in other articles why he picks these two, I ask here how the combination produces a unified thing. At one point, Scotus proposes an analogy for the two inclinations with the relations of genus and differentia which produce a unified definition. In arguing that the analogy does not succeed, I hope to have given a clearer understanding of the theory of dual affections
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