Biology and Philosophy 16 (3) (2001)
|Abstract||The view that moral cognition is subserved by a two-tieredarchitecture is defended: Moral reasoning is the result both ofspecialized, informationally encapsulated modules which automaticallyand effortlessly generate intuitions; and of general-purpose,cognitively penetrable mechanisms which enable moral judgment in thelight of the agent's general fund of knowledge. This view is contrastedwith rival architectures of social/moral cognition, such as Cosmidesand Tooby's view that the mind is wholly modular, and it is argued thata two-tiered architecture is more plausible.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Manuel Hernández-Iglesias (2006). Generalism Without Foundations. Acta Analytica 21 (2):71-86.
Andrew Sneddon (2007). A Social Model of Moral Dumbfounding: Implications for Studying Moral Reasoning and Moral Judgment. Philosophical Psychology 20 (6):731 – 748.
Rachel Tillman (2013). Ethical Embodiment and Moral Reasoning: A Challenge to Peter Singer. Hypatia 28 (1):18-31.
Gilbert Harman, Kelby Mason & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2010). Moral Reasoning. In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press.
Joseph M. Paxton & Joshua D. Greene (2010). Moral Reasoning: Hints and Allegations. Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):511-527.
Cordelia Fine (2006). Is the Emotional Dog Wagging its Rational Tail, or Chasing It? Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):83 – 98.
John Bolender (2003). The Genealogy of the Moral Modules. Minds and Machines 13 (2):233-255.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads10 ( #106,175 of 548,984 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?