Epistemic representation, informativeness and the aim of faithful representation

Synthese 190 (2):219-234 (2013)
Abstract
In this paper, I take scientific models to be epistemic representations of their target systems. I define an epistemic representation to be a tool for gaining information about its target system and argue that a vehicle’s capacity to provide specific information about its target system—its informativeness—is an essential feature of this kind of representation. I draw an analogy to our ordinary notion of interpretation to show that a user’s aim of faithfully representing the target system is necessary for securing this feature.
Keywords Models  Representation  Interpretation  Surrogative reasoning  Informativeness
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References found in this work BETA
Mauricio Suarez (2003). Scientific Representation: Against Similarity and Isomorphism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (3):225-244.

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