Mind, Meaning, and Mental Disorder: The Nature of Causal Explanation in Psychology and Psychiatry
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (1996)
Philosophical ideas about the mind, brain, and behavior can seem theoretical and unimportant when placed alongside the urgent questions of mental distress and disorder. However, there is a need to give direction to attempts to answer these questions. On the one hand, a substantial research effort is going into the investigation of brain processes and the development of drug treatments for psychiatric disorders, and on the other, a wide range of psychotherapies is becoming available to adults and children with mental health problems. These two strands reflect traditional distinctions between mind and body, and causal as opposed to meaningful explanations of behavior. In this book, which has been written for psychiatrists, psychologists, philosophers, and others in related fields, the authors propose a radical re-interpretation of these traditional distinctions. Throughout the discussions philosophical theories are brought to bear on the particular questions of the explanation of behaviors, the nature of mental causation, and eventually the origins of major disorders including depression, anxiety disorders, schizophrenia, and personality disorder.
|Keywords||Mental illness Philosophy Mental illness Etiology Philosophy of mind Intentionality (Philosophy Causation Mind and body Meaning (Philosophy Mental Disorders etiology Philosophy Neuropsychology|
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|Call number||RC437.5.B65 1996|
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Citations of this work BETA
Anthony Reading (2006). The Biological Nature of Meaningful Information. Biological Theory 1 (3):243-249.
Malcolm Parker (2010). Diagnosis, Power and Certainty: Response to Davis. [REVIEW] Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 7 (3):291-297.
Maël Lemoine (2012). How Does a Psychiatrist Infer From an Observed Condition to a Case of Mental Disorder? Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18 (5):979-983.
John L. Cox (2011). Empathy, Identity and Engagement in Person‐Centred Medicine: The Sociocultural Context. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 17 (2):350-353.
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