David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Minds and Machines 13 (2):233-255 (2003)
This paper defends a cognitive theory of those emotional reactions which motivate and constrain moral judgment. On this theory, moral emotions result from mental faculties specialized for automatically producing feelings of approval or disapproval in response to mental representations of various social situations and actions. These faculties are modules in Fodor's sense, since they are informationally encapsulated, specialized, and contain innate information about social situations. The paper also tries to shed light on which moral modules there are, which of these modules we share with non-human primates, and on the (pre-)history and development of this modular system from pre-humans through gatherer-hunters and on to modern (i.e. arablist) humans. The theory is not, however, meant to explain all moral reasoning. It is plausible that a non-modular intelligence at least sometimes play a role in conscious moral thought. However, even non-modular moral reasoning is initiated and constrained by moral emotions having modular sources.
|Keywords||Emotion Intelligence Metaphysics Module Moral Judgment Representation|
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Citations of this work BETA
Steffen Giessner & Niels van Quaquebeke (2010). Using a Relational Models Perspective to Understand Normatively Appropriate Conduct in Ethical Leadership. Journal of Business Ethics 95 (1):43-55.
Steffen Giessner & Niels van Quaquebeke (2010). Using a Relational Models Perspective to Understand Normatively Appropriate Conduct in Ethical Leadership. Journal of Business Ethics 95 (S1):43 - 55.
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