In Krzysztof Apt (ed.), Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK XIII) (2011)
|Abstract||Within the context of extensive-form (or dynamic) games, we use choice frames to represent the initial beliefs of a player as well as her disposition to change those beliefs when she learns that an information set of hers has been reached. As shown in , in order for the revision operation to be consistent with the AGM postulates , the player’s choice frame must be rationalizable in terms of a total pre-order on the set of histories. We consider four properties of choice frames and show that, together with the hypothesis of a common prior, are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a plausibility order that rationalizes the epistemic state (that is, initial beliefs and disposition to revise those beliefs) of all the players. The plausibility order satisfies the properties introduced in  as part of a new definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium for dynamic games. Thus the present paper provides epistemic foundations for that solution concept|
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