Against conditional obligation

Noûs 32 (1):37-53 (1998)
The crucial feature of obligation sentences to which the puzzles point is that such sentences, and evaluative sentences more generally, are defeasible. They may be warranted, given some information, only to be defeated by further information. A theory that recognizes this no longer needs to see conditional obligation as anything more than a simple combination of unary obligation and the conditional.
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DOI 10.1111/0029-4624.00086
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