A simple modal logic for belief revision

Synthese 147 (2):193 - 228 (2005)
We propose a modal logic based on three operators, representing intial beliefs, information and revised beliefs. Three simple axioms are used to provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the qualitative part of Bayes’ rule. Some theorems of this logic are derived concerning the interaction between current beliefs and future beliefs. Information flows and iterated revision are also discussed.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
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References found in this work BETA
Nir Friedman & Joseph Y. Halpern (1999). Belief Revision: A Critique. [REVIEW] Journal of Logic, Language and Information 8 (4):401-420.

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Citations of this work BETA
Sebastian Enqvist (2009). Interrogative Belief Revision in Modal Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (5):527 - 548.

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