Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues

Oxford, England and Malden, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by Ernest Sosa (2003)
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Abstract

Ever since Plato it has been thought that one knows only if one's belief hits the mark of truth and does so with adequate justification. The issues debated by Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa concern mostly the nature and conditions of such epistemic justification, and its place in our understanding of human knowledge. Presents central issues pertaining to internalism vs. externalism and foundationalism vs. virtue epistemology in the form of a philosophical debate. Introduces students to fundamental questions within epistemology while engaging in contemporary debates. Written by two of today’s foremost epistemologists. Includes an extensive bibliography

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Ernest Sosa
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

On the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.
Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology.Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):495-527.
Virtue Epistemology.John Turri, Mark Alfano & John Greco - 1999 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-51.
The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):363-387.
The ontology of epistemic reasons.John Turri - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):490-512.

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