Foundationalism and the external world

Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):229-249 (1999)
Outlines a tenable version of a traditional foundationalist account\nof empirical justification and its implications for the justification\nof beliefs about physical or material objects. Presupposing the acceptability\nof other beliefs about physical objects; Concept of a basic belief;\nMetabeliefs about one's own occurrent beliefs; Beliefs about sensory\nexperience
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James Beebe (2009). The Abductivist Reply to Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):605 - 636.
Brian Weatherson (2003). Are You a Sim? Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):425–431.

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