Inexact knowledge with introspection

Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (2):179 - 227 (2009)
Abstract
Standard Kripke models are inadequate to model situations of inexact knowledge with introspection, since positive and negative introspection force the relation of epistemic indiscernibility to be transitive and euclidean. Correlatively, Williamson’s margin for error semantics for inexact knowledge invalidates axioms 4 and 5. We present a new semantics for modal logic which is shown to be complete for K45, without constraining the accessibility relation to be transitive or euclidean. The semantics corresponds to a system of modular knowledge, in which iterated modalities and simple modalities are not on a par. We show how the semantics helps to solve Williamson’s luminosity paradox, and argue that it corresponds to an integrated model of perceptual and introspective knowledge that is psychologically more plausible than the one defended by Williamson. We formulate a generalized version of the semantics, called token semantics, in which modalities are iteration-sensitive up to degree n and insensitive beyond n. The multi-agent version of the semantics yields a resource-sensitive logic with implications for the representation of common knowledge in situations of bounded rationality.
Keywords Inexact knowledge  Epistemic logic  Kripke semantics  Token semantics  Centered semantics  Introspection  Luminosity  Vagueness  Margin for error  Common knowledge  Bounded rationality
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References found in this work BETA
Denis Bonnay & Paul Egré (2008). Margins for Error in Context. In G. Carpintero & M. Koelbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. 103--107.

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Citations of this work BETA
Patrick Allo (2013). The Many Faces of Closure and Introspection. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):91-124.
Eleonora Cresto (2012). A Defense of Temperate Epistemic Transparency. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):923-955.

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