Can good news lead to a more pessimistic choice of action?

Theory and Decision 25 (2):123-136 (1988)
Adapting a definition introduced by Milgrom (1981) we say that a signal about the environment is good news relative to some initial beliefs if the posterior beliefs dominate the initial beliefs in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance (the assumption being that higher values of the parameter representing the environment mean better environments). We give an example where good news leads to the adoption of a more pessimistic course of action (we say that action a, reveals greater pessimism than action a„ if it gives higher payoff in bad environments and lower payoff in good environments). We then give sufficient conditions for a signal not to induce a more pessimistic choice of action.
Keywords Bayesian updating  first-order stochastic dominance
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00134156
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,831
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Richard Holton (2006). The Act of Choice. Philosophers' Imprint 6 (3):1-15.
Torbjörn Tännsjö (2007). Social Psychology and the Paradox of Revolution. South African Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):228-238.
Richard Swinburne (1985). Desire. Philosophy 60 (234):429 - 445.
J. David Velleman (2007). What Good is a Will? In Anton Leist & Holger Baumann (eds.), Action in Context. De Gruyter/Mouton
Andy Egan & Adam Elga (2005). I Can't Believe I'm Stupid. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):77–93.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

11 ( #212,738 of 1,724,747 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #167,193 of 1,724,747 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.