Sellars vs. the given

John McDowell, Richard Rorty, and Robert Brandom invoke Sellars’s arguments against the Myth of the Given as having shown that the Given is nothing more than a myth. But most of Sellars’s arguments attack logical atomism, not the framework of givenness as such. Moreover, they do not succeed. At crucial points the arguments confuse the perspectives of a knower and those attributing knowledge to a knower. Only one argument-the “inconsistent triad” argument-addresses the Myth of the Given as such, and there are several ways of escaping its conclusion. Invocations of Sellars’s refutation of the Myth of the Given are empty
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00140.x
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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Philip Pettit (2003). Looks as Powers. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):221-52.

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