Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):277 – 293 (2006)
|Abstract||In this paper, the ontological, terminological, epistemological, and ethical aspects of omission are considered in a coherent and balanced framework, based on the idea that there are omissions which are actions and omissions which are non-actions. In particular, we suggest that the approach to causation which best deals with omission is Mackie's INUS conditional proposal. We argue that omissions are determined partly by the ontological conditional structure of reality, and partly by the interests, beliefs, and values of observers. The final upshot is that moral judgments involved in cases of omissions cannot be grounded on, but are the ground for judgments about what INUS conditions count as omissions.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||No categories specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jeremy Byrd (2007). Moral Responsibility and Omissions. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):56–67.
Andrew McGee (2011). Omissions, Causation, and Responsibility. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 8 (4):351-361.
Michael Barnwell (2010). The Problem of Negligent Omissions: Medieval Action Theories to the Rescue. Brill.
Christopher J. Anderson (2005). Alternative Perspectives on Omission Bias. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):544-544.
D. Zimmerman (1994). Acts, Omissions, and Semi-Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):209-23.
Alfred R. Mele (2000). Reactive Attitudes, Reactivity, and Omissions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):447-452.
Sarah McGrath (2005). Causation by Omission: A Dilemma. Philosophical Studies 123 (1-2):125--48.
John Martin Fischer (1997). Responsibility, Control, and Omissions. Journal of Ethics 1 (1):45-64.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads31 ( #39,249 of 548,977 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,799 of 548,977 )
How can I increase my downloads?