A new argument for pragmatism?

Philosophia 36 (2):227-231 (2008)
Shah, N. The Philosophical Quarterly, 56, 481–498 (2006) has defended evidentialism on the premise that only it (and not pragmatism) is consistent with both (a) the deliberative constraint on reasons and (b) the transparency feature of belief. I show, however, that the deliberative constraint on reasons is also problematic for evidentialism. I also suggest a way for pragmatism to be construed so as to make it consistent with both (a) and (b) and argue that a similar move is not available to the evidentialist. Thus, far from settling the debate in favour of evidentialism, considerations concerning the deliberative constraint on reasons support pragmatism.
Keywords Epistemology  Evidentialism  The ethics of belief  Pragmatism
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-007-9105-5
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Nishi Shah (2006). A New Argument for Evidentialism. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.

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