David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 187 (2):509-517 (2012)
To be a doxastic deontologist is to claim that there is such a thing as an ethics of belief (or of our doxastic attitudes in general). In other words, that we are subject to certain duties with respect to our doxastic attitudes, the non-compliance with which makes us blameworthy and that we should understand doxastic justification in terms of these duties. In this paper, I argue that these duties are our all things considered duties, and not our epistemic or moral duties, for example. I show how this has the surprising result that, if deontologism is a thesis about doxastic justification, it entails that there is no such thing as epistemic or moral justification for a belief that p. I then suggest why this result, though controversial, may have some salutary consequences: primarily that it helps us make some sense of an otherwise puzzling situation regarding doxastic dilemmas.
|Keywords||Epistemology Ethics of belief All things considered duties|
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References found in this work BETA
William Alston (1989). Epistemic Justification. Cornell University Press.
Anthony Robert Booth (2007). The Two Faces of Evidentialism. Erkenntnis 67 (3):401 - 417.
Anthony Robert Booth & Rik Peels (2010). Why Responsible Belief is Blameless Belief. Journal of Philosophy 107 (5):257-265.
Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2004). Evidentialism. Oxford University Press.
Richard Foley (1993). Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Anthony Robert Booth (2012). Epistemic Ought is a Commensurable Ought. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):n/a-n/a.
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