Online research in philosophy

The Golden Rule is endorsed in oneform or another by most cultures and majorreligions and is still espoused byphilosophers, business ethicists, and popularbusiness authors. Because it also resonateswith undergraduate business majors, it can bean effective teaching tool. This paperdescribes a way of teaching the Golden Rulethrough a series of business-oriented examplesintended to bring out its strengths andweaknesses. The method described alsointroduces students to some basic moralreasoning skills and acquaints them with a widerange of moral issues that arise in business. Kant's Formula of Humanity is discussed in thefinal section as a principle that overcomes atleast some of the Golden Rule's defects.

The golden rule is most adequately conceived as a series of ascending principles about pleasure, sympathy, reason, brotherly or sisterly love, moral insight, and God-consciousness. The account draws primarily on Christian and Confucian traditions and on studies by contemporary philosophers. Questions are then discussed about the use of substantive moral assumptions and intuition in the rule, its supererogatory character, and the role of its spiritual level. The golden rule is proposed as a principle bearing valuable meanings from its diverse cultural heritage.

: Here a moral principle called the "Copper Rule" is developed and defended as an alternative to the Golden Rule. First, the article focuses on two problems with the Golden Rule's traditional formulation of "Do (or don't do) unto others what you would (or would not) have them do unto you": it assumes (1) the uniformity of human needs and preferences and (2) that whatever is universally desired is good. Second, it examines three attempts to reformulate the Golden Rule—Marcus Singer's general interpretation, Allan Gewirth's rationalization, and R. M. Hare's imaginative role reversal— to show why they all fail to save the Golden Rule from difficulty.Third, the rich resources of the Chinese Confucian-Daoist philosophical traditions are appropriated to develop a "Copper Rule" as an alternative moral principle: "Do (or don't do) unto others as they would (or would not) have us do unto them." This moral principle not only avoids the two problems, but also has additional advantages.Finally, the "Copper Rule" is defended against three objections or counterarguments: what if people ask you (forexample) (1) to kill someone else, (2) to kill them, or (3) to kill yourself? The appropriate response is merely to trace the implications of the "Copper Rule" rather than add any ad hoc arguments.

The golden rule, perhaps the most recognizable moral maxim in Western culture, is an inadequate basis for morality. In light of its flaws as a precept and its apparent lack of moral content, it is initially perplexing that the historic Judeo-Christian tradition has often linked the golden rule with the second greatest command to love one's neighbor as oneself. However, after examining the presuppositions behind this link and investigating the biblical context of these sayings, it is clear that the Judeo-Christian tradition is justified in making this connection. Although the golden rule and the love command should not be conflated and their distinctions should not be abandoned, the biblical intention of the golden rule can only be understood and properly practiced in connection with the love command.

Philosophy to the rescue -- What is the soul? -- Life begins at conception. So what? -- Abnormal human development -- Responsibility -- The potentiality argument -- The golden rule argument against abortion -- Rights of the pregnant woman -- Consequences -- Virtue ethics and conclusion.

In his A Defense of Abortion David Boonin largely misreads one of the oldest and most defensible arguments against abortion, the argument based on the fetus’s rational nature. In this paper it will be shown that Boonin’s characterization of this argument isinaccurate, that his criticisms of it are therefore ineffective, and that his own criterion—the possession of a “present, dispositional, ideal desire for a future like ours”—is insufficient to ground a human being’s right to life. Boonin’s misread of this classic argument is largelythe result of his focus upon the “properties,” as opposed to the nature, of a fetus and his failure to consider the notion of a rational nature as ordered to rational activities. In addition, his argument for abortion rights fails on its own terms because it ultimately licensesinfanticide. Infants have desires and they possess a future like ours, but they do not have any desire for a future like ours.