Compatibilism and Free Belief

Philosophical Papers 38 (1):1-12 (2009)
Abstract
Matthias Steup (Steup 2008) has recently argued that our doxastic attitudes are free by (i) drawing an analogy with compatibilism about freedom of action and (ii) denying that it is a necessary condition for believing at will that S's having an intention to believe that p can cause S to believe that p . In this paper, however, I argue that the strategies espoused in (i) and (ii) are incompatible
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    References found in this work BETA
    Bill Pollard (2006). Explaining Actions with Habits. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):57 - 69.
    Citations of this work BETA
    Rik Peels (2013). Against Doxastic Compatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3).
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