Compatibilism and Free Belief

Philosophical Papers 38 (1):1-12 (2009)
Matthias Steup (Steup 2008) has recently argued that our doxastic attitudes are free by (i) drawing an analogy with compatibilism about freedom of action and (ii) denying that it is a necessary condition for believing at will that S's having an intention to believe that p can cause S to believe that p . In this paper, however, I argue that the strategies espoused in (i) and (ii) are incompatible
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/05568640902933379
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Bill Pollard (2006). Explaining Actions with Habits. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):57 - 69.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Rik Peels (2014). Against Doxastic Compatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):679-702.
Conor Mchugh (2014). Exercising Doxastic Freedom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

59 ( #57,882 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #231,316 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.