Can there be epistemic reasons for action?

Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):133-144 (2006)
Abstract
In this paper I consider whether there can be such things as epistemic reasons for action. I consider three arguments to the contrary and argue that none are successful, being either somewhat question-begging or too strong by ruling out what most epistemologists think is a necessary feature of epistemic justification, namely the epistemic basing relation. I end by suggesting a "non-cognitivist" model of epistemic reasons that makes room for there being epistemic reasons for action and suggest that this model may support moral realism.
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Citations of this work BETA
Anthony Robert Booth (2012). Epistemic Ought is a Commensurable Ought. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):n/a-n/a.
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