Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||The aim for this thesis is to motivate, critically evaluate and defend the claim that subjects are able to consciously perceive the affordances of objects. I will present my protagonist, the ‘Conscious Affordance Theorist’, with what are two main obstacles to this claim. The first of these is that affordance perception correctly understood refers only to a kind of subpersonal visual processing, and not to a kind of conscious visual experience. I claim that this results in an explanatory gap at the level of intentional action, which in order to correct we need to redefine the notion of affordance perception to include conscious as well as subpersonal affordance perception. Precisely, I claim that ‘affordance awareness’ has a crucial epistemological role to play, and that subjects must be able to consciously experience affordances in order to gain this awareness. In answer to this claim, I supplement the objection that affordance perception is defined as subpersonal perception to include the claim that any awareness subjects have of the affordances of objects they visually experience is due to them having thoughts about those affordances, and not visual experience of them. I then consider the Conscious Affordance Theorist’s response to this supplemented account. The second obstacle is the claim that conscious visual affordance perception is an impossible notion given that affordances are dispositional properties, and the dispositional properties of objects cannot be ‘seen’. In facing this objection I look to the supporting claims and motivations that lie behind it, in order to find a way for the Conscious Affordance Theorist to challenge its central claim that affordances cannot be seen. I end this thesis with an account of the Conscious Affordance Theorist’s own positive position, and a consideration of how his account has the ability to provide for conscious affordance perception in the case of non-human animals|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Silvano Zipoli Caiani (forthcoming). Extending the Notion of Affordance. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.
Adrian Alsmith (2012). The Concept of a Structural Affordance. Avant 3 (2):94-107.
Dobromir G. Dotov, Lin Nie & Matthieu M. de Wit (2012). Understanding Affordances: History and Contemporary Development of Gibson's Central Concept. Avant 3 (2):28-39.
Harry Heft (1989). Affordances and the Body: An Intentional Analysis of Gibson's Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 19 (1):1–30.
Rob Withagen & Anthony Chemero (2011). Affordances and Classification: On the Significance of a Sidebar in James Gibson's Last Book. Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):521 - 537.
Andrea Scarantino (2003). Affordances Explained. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):949-961.
Paul J. Treffner (1999). The Common Structure is the Affordance in the Ecology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):731-732.
Thomas Natsoulas (2004). To See Things is to Perceive What They Afford: James J. Gibson's Concept of Affordance. Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (4):323-347.
Thomas E. Horton, Arpan Chakraborty & Robert St Amant (2012). Affordances for Robots: A Brief Survey. Avant 3 (2):70-84.
Annemiek D. Barsingerhorn, Frank T. J. M. Zaal, Joanne Smith & Gert-Jan Pepping (2012). On Possibilities for Action: The Past, Present and Future of Affordance Research. Avant 3 (2):54-69.
Glyn W. Humphreys & M. Jane Riddoch (2007). How to Define an Object: Evidence From the Effects of Action on Perception and Attention. Mind and Language 22 (5):534–547.
Arthur M. Glenberg, Monica R. Cowart & Michael P. Kaschak (2001). An Affordance Field for Guiding Movement and Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1):43-44.
Adrian J. T. Smith (2009). Acting on (Bodily) Experience. Psyche 15 (1):82 - 99.
Added to index2012-01-10
Total downloads5 ( #170,394 of 740,548 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,455 of 740,548 )
How can I increase my downloads?