Graduate studies at Western
European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2) (2012)
|Abstract||I argue that the claim that epistemic ought is incommensurable is self-defeating. My argument, however, depends on the truth of the premise that there can be not only epistemic reasons for belief, but also non-epistemic (e.g., moral) reasons for belief. So I also provide some support for that claim|
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