Epistemic Ought is a Commensurable Ought

European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):529-539 (2014)
I argue that the claim that epistemic ought is incommensurable is self-defeating. My argument, however, depends on the truth of the premise that there can be not only epistemic reasons for belief, but also non-epistemic reasons for belief. So I also provide some support for that claim
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00501.x
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