Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Object‐Given Reasons

In this paper I discuss two claims; the first is the claim that state-given reasons for belief are of a radically different kind to object-given reasons for belief. The second is that, where this last claim is true, epistemic reasons are object-given reasons for belief (EOG). I argue that EOG has two implausible consequences: (i) that suspension of judgement can never be epistemically justified, and (ii) that the reason that epistemically justifies a belief that p can never be the reason for which one believes that p.
Keywords agnosticism  state-given reasons
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00631.x
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References found in this work BETA
Jonathan Schaffer (2007). Knowing the Answer. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):383-403.
Pamela Hieronymi (2005). The Wrong Kind of Reason. Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.
Nishi Shah (2006). A New Argument for Evidentialism. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.

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Jane Friedman (2013). Question‐Directed Attitudes. Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):145-174.

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