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- J. E. Boodin (1943). The Vision of Parmenides. Philosophical Review 52 (6):578-589.
Similar books and articles
William F. Lynch, S. J. An Approach to the Metaphysics of Plato through the Parmenides, Georgetown University Press, 1959, 255 pp. $ 6.00 Robert S. Brumbaugh, Plato on the One. The Hypotheses in the Parmenides, Yale University Press, New Haven 1961, 365 pp. $ 6.50.
This article describes Syrianus' teachings on the One, as found in his testimonia on the Parmenides . In order to preserve the transcendence of the One, while still providing a fluid universe connected to the One, Syrianus shows how the nature of the One is seen in the structure of the Parmenides itself: the first hypothesis of the Parmenides outlines the primal God, while the intelligible universe is the subject of the second hypothesis, in so far as the intelligible universe is a product of the One. Thus, whatever is negated of the One in the first hypothesis contains a positive analogue in the second hypothesis. With this description of the One in the Parmenides , Syrianus is able to create a complete, fluid universe. Readings of two lemmata, in particular, illuminate Syrianus' manner of interpreting the Parmenides to show how the One is both transcendent and connected to the universe. In his interpretations of Parmenides 137d and 138a, Syrianus shows how the One is partless with respect to itself, but contains parts with respect to the rest of the universe; and that the One is in itself and in another, again, with respect to itself and with respect to the rest of the universe. With his interpretation of the Parmenides , moreover, one can see how Syrianus differs from the interpretations of Porphyry and Iamblichus, and how he paves the way for Proclus' reading of the dialogue.
A review of Plato's Parmenides, The Conversion of the Soul, by Mitchell H. Miller Junior. The Parmenides is seen as offering readers a chance to appropriate fully by critical and conceptual inquiry what was given in the Republic in the modes of image and analogy.
Does Parmenides really use the non-existence argument to deny the past?
v. 1. Plato's Parmenides: history and interpretation from the old academy to later platonism and gnosticism -- Section 1: Plato, from the the old academy to middle platonism -- Section 2: Middle platonic and gnostic texts -- v. 2. Plato's Parmenides: its reception in neoplatonic, Jewish, and Christian texts -- Section 1: Parmenides interpretation from Plotinus to Damascius -- Section 2: The hidden influence of the Parmenides in philo, origen, and later patristic thought.
The following is my interpretation of the philosophy of Parmenides of Elea , the Greek father of metaphysics. His only work, On Nature , is written in rather obscure verse, and so his thesis can be viewed from a variety of perspectives, of which mine is only one (although a fairly standard one). Parmenides' most important principle, hereafter called "Parmenides' Principle", was that anything rationally conceivable must exist. Nonbeing is not a thing and can neither be thought of nor spoken about in any meaningful or coherent way. Parmenides forbade talking as if there are possible things that nonetheless do not exist. He illustrated this principle by showing us three possible methods of inquiry, of which only one is valid. The following chart summarizes them.
In his great poem, Parmenides uses an argument by elimination to select the correct "way of inquiry" from a pool of two, the ways of is and of is not , joined later by a third, "mixed" way of is and is not . Parmenides' first two ways are soon given modal upgrades - is becomes cannot not be , and is not becomes necessarily is not (B2, 3-6) - and these are no longer contradictories of one another. And is the common view right, that Parmenides rejects the "mixed" way because it is a contradiction? I argue that the modal upgrades are the product of an illicit modal shift. This same shift, built into two Exclusion Arguments, gives Parmenides a novel argument to show that the "mixed" way fails. Given the independent failure of the way of is not , Parmenides' argument by elimination is complete.
Discussion of J. E. Boodin, The vision of parmenides
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