A performadox in truth-conditional semantics

Linguistics and Philosophy 4 (1):71 - 100 (1980)
Abstract
An argument is developed at some length to show that any semantical theory which treats superficially nonperformative sentences as being governed by performative prefaces at some level of underlying structure must either leave those sentences semantically uninterpreted or assign them the wrong truth-conditions. Several possible escapes from this dilemma are examined; it is tentatively concluded that such hypotheses as the Ross-Lakoff-Sadock Performative Analysis should be rejected despite their attractions.
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References found in this work BETA
M. J. Cresswell (1973). Logics and Languages. London,Methuen [Distributed in the U.S.A. By Harper & Row.

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Citations of this work BETA
Stefano Predelli (2008). Vocatives. Analysis 68 (298):97–105.
William G. Lycan (1989). Reply to Lakoff. Philosophical Psychology 2 (1):77 – 84.
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